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FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS
ON PREVIOUS SYMPOSIA
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE OF
THE STRICKLAND STANDARD IN





Not until the twentieth century did the United States Supreme Court rule
that all criminal defendants, whether in state or federal court, had a right to be
represented by counsel under the Sixth Amendment.1  Until nearly the end of
that century, however, the Court went no further than stating that defendants
had a right to counsel, without specifying whether that meant competent coun-
sel.  In 1984, there were two landmark cases in Sixth Amendment jurispru-
dence.  The first is the source of the requirement that counsel provide effective
assistance, although the Court did not clarify what such assistance would entail.2
Out of this requirement have arisen countless appeals based on ineffective assis-
tance of counsel (“IAC”).  Until the Court heard the second landmark case,
Strickland v. Washington,3 that same year, courts ruled on these claims without
any guidance.  The Court defined effective assistance of counsel according to
what it was not: a deficient performance that so prejudiced the defense as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial.4
The Court gave little guidance about what constitutes a constitutionally de-
ficient performance, and even less to how prejudicial the effect of the deficient
performance has to be in order to be found unconstitutional.  As a result, the
Court did little more than to sanction the broad discretion already employed by
courts in considering IAC claims.  This discretion leads to arbitrary determina-
tions in capital cases, which, although they may satisfy the low bar set for Sixth
Amendment analysis, violate the Eighth Amendment.
In the 1995 Law and Contemporary Problems symposium entitled “Toward
a More Effective Right to Assistance of Counsel,” Professor Uelmen gave a
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1. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see also infra notes 11-25 and accompanying
text.
2. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
3. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 87-113.
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“guided tour” of the Sixth Amendment from which he gleaned several lessons.5
First, criminal defense will never have a high funding priority in this nation.6
Second, the difference between no counsel and incompetent counsel is a judicial
fiction that enables courts to make distinctions under the Sixth Amendment
that do not exist in reality.7  Finally, Professor Uelmen noted the shortcomings
in the current standards for legal counsel: “[I]f courts regarded the competence
of defense counsel as just as essential to the achievement of justice as the com-
petence of the judge, we would certainly see a different standard of competence
applied.”8  It is these lessons, combined with the utter lack of any meaningful
guidance from the Supreme Court as to what constitutes a prejudicial effect,
that makes the Strickland standard a violation of the Eighth Amendment.  Just
as legislation that gave juries complete and unguided discretion over the sen-
tencing of capital defendants was deemed unconstitutional because it resulted
in arbitrary punishment,9 so the Strickland standard is unconstitutional because
it recreates those same problems at the appellate level.
Criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to effective assistance of coun-
sel under the Sixth Amendment, but the Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland
has given appellate courts overly broad discretion to determine exactly what
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.  As a result, there is little consis-
tency within judicial districts or across districts.10  Legal assistance that might be
constitutionally deficient and prejudicial before one judge may not even be con-
sidered unreasonable before another.  Although most courts and legal scholars
have examined the constitutionality of the assistance of counsel on an individual
basis under Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the appellate review of IAC
claims in capital cases itself violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment, especially as it is analyzed in Furman v. Georgia,11 be-
cause it results in impermissible arbitrariness in the sentencing of capital defen-
dants.  Part II of this note begins with a review of the right to counsel, which
leads to a discussion of the importance of this right in capital cases.  Part III dis-
cusses the crucial role of counsel in capital cases throughout the trial and ap-
pellate processes.  In Part IV, the Strickland decision is analyzed from a consti-
tutional perspective, and from a pragmatic approach that considers outside
factors that influenced the jury’s decision.  The final section of Part IV reviews
some decisions that have applied the Strickland standard, comparing the facts
and the outcome on appeal.  While this note does not attempt to catalogue
every case that has made an IAC claim, its comparison of similar capital cases
demonstrates the impermissible level of arbitrariness that stems from the
5. See Gerald F. Uelmen, 2001: A Train Ride: A Guided Tour of the Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13 (Winter 1995).
6. See id. at 28.
7. See id.
8. Id.
9. See infra notes 117-22.
10. See discussion infra Part IV, Section D at pp. 31-38.
11. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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Strickland decision.  In conclusion, this note argues that the current test for IAC
claims is unconstitutional, failing to provide proper guidance and resulting in
impermissible arbitrary disposition of IAC claims.
II
BACKGROUND: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Sixth Amendment provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence
[sic].”12  While this provision was initially held to be applicable only to federal
criminal cases, the Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama13 held that denial of the
right to counsel in a state rape case violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.14  Seven young black men traveling on a train bound
for Alabama were accused of assaulting two white girls;15 they were taken into
custody upon the train’s arrival.  During the course of the proceedings, which
the Supreme Court characterized as taking place in a hostile environment,16 the
court never appointed counsel for the defendants.  Instead, the court “‘ap-
pointed all the members of the bar’ for the limited ‘purpose of arraigning the
defendants.’”17  But no attorney ever stepped forward to accept the appoint-
ment, and the defendants were tried and convicted without any counsel to assist
them.18  The Supreme Court first undertook a factual determination of whether
the defendants were in substance denied the right of counsel.19  Upon the de-
termination that the court’s general appointment of the entire bar resulted in no
appointment at all, the Court undertook an analysis of the application of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the right to counsel for criminal defendants.20
The Court held that denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel vio-
lated those “‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base
of all our civil and political institutions.’”21  As such, even though the Sixth
Amendment specifically dealt with the issue, denial of counsel in a state crimi-
nal rape proceeding “is obviously one of those compelling considerations which
must prevail in determining whether it is embraced within the due process
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  Prior to its decisions regarding the right to counsel in all state cases,
the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment precluded a valid conviction and sentencing where
the defendant was not represented by counsel and had not “competently and intelligently waived his
constitutional right” to counsel.  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938).  A judgment obtained
without assistance of counsel, where the right was not waived, was void, and an individual imprisoned
thereunder was entitled to release by habeas corpus.  See id.
13. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
14. See id. at 70.
15. See id. at 57.
16. See id. at 51.
17. Id. at 56.
18. See id. at 50.
19. See id. at 53-56.
20. See id. at 60-73.
21. Id. at 67 (quoting Hebert v. State of Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926)).
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clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”22  While the language of the Powell de-
cision did not appear to be limited to the particular facts of the case, a subse-
quent decision by the Court significantly narrowed its scope.23
Asserted denial [of due process] is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts
in a given case.  That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental
fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in
the light of other considerations, fall short of such denial.24
Twenty years after the Court removed the teeth from the Powell decision, it
revisited the issue of whether states must appoint counsel for defendants in
criminal prosecutions and whether the right to counsel was a fundamental right
protected under the Due Process Clause.25  In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court
overruled its fact-specific application of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in state proceedings, stating that “[w]e think the Court in Betts had ample
precedent for acknowledging that those guarantees of the Bill of Rights which
are fundamental safeguards of liberty immune from federal abridgment are
equally protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.”26  After reviewing the Powell decision and other case law,
the Court concluded that the right to counsel was indeed a fundamental right,
mandating its protection by the states.27
The Supreme Court elaborated somewhat on what exactly is required under
the Sixth Amendment in United States v. Cronic.28  Here, the Court stated that:
the presumption that counsel’s assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a
trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.  Similarly, if
counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial test-
ing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary
process itself presumptively unreliable.29
While the Court had considered Sixth Amendment claims based on actual
or constructive denial of assistance of counsel or state interference with coun-
sel’s ability to render effective assistance, it did not address the issue of “actual
ineffectiveness” until its decision in Strickland.30  The deep impact on capital de-
fendants of that decision is analyzed below.
22. Id.
23. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
24. Id. at 462.
25. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
26. Id. at 341.
27. See id. at 344.
28. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
29. Id. at 659.
30. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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III
THE INTERSECTION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AND CAPITAL CASES: WHY
AND WHERE IT IS MOST IMPORTANT
Counsel plays an especially crucial role in the prosecution of capital cases:
“A capital trial is, in substance, two separate trials—the guilt/not guilty trial and
the penalty trial.”31  As in any criminal proceeding, the capital defendant relies
on his attorney’s knowledge and skill to prevent a conviction.  Unlike other
criminal defendants, however, only capital defendants face the risk of losing
their lives as well as their liberty.  Although the defendant’s own actions pre-
sumably play a large part in determining whether he or she will live or die, the
responsibility for handling the sentencing phase of a capital trial rests squarely
on the attorney’s shoulders.  While the defendant has some say over what ave-
nues of investigation are pursued, the attorney must plan and present the miti-
gation evidence during the penalty phase.32  Further, the attorney’s presentation
of mitigating evidence has a direct bearing on the appellate court’s ability to ex-
ercise meaningful proportionality review.33
The American Bar Association, in establishing its 1989 guidelines for the
appointment and performance of counsel in death penalty cases, acknowledged
the crucial role played by such counsel:
[D]eath penalty cases have become so specialized that defense counsel has duties and
functions definably different from those of counsel in ordinary cases . . . . At every
stage of a capital case, counsel must be aware of specialized and frequently changing
legal principles and rules, and be able to develop strategies applying them in the pres-
sure-filled environment of high-stakes, complex litigation.34
Trial counsel in capital cases face a dizzying array of tactical decisions, as well as
the requirement of performing capably in a number of complex undertakings.
For example, the lawyer must be able to apply sophisticated jury selection tech-
niques, including attempted rehabilitation of venire members who initially state
opposition to the death penalty.35  In addition, she must know how to find and
31. American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases (Feb. 1989) (Commentary to Guideline 1.1, Objective) [hereinafter ABA Guide-
lines].
32. An attorney on a capital case may explore virtually any avenue of the defendant’s past, so long
as it amounts to mitigating evidence.  The Supreme Court has held that states may not limit the presen-
tation of such relevant information during the sentencing phase.  See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608
(1978) (“To meet constitutional requirements, a death penalty statute must not preclude consideration
of relevant mitigating factors.”).  Therefore, the attorney must conduct an exceedingly thorough inves-
tigation of the defendant’s life, leaving no stone unturned.  See Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life:
Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 299, 324 (1983) (“There must
be an inquiry into the client’s childhood, upbringing, education, relationships, friendships, formative
and traumatic experiences, personal psychology, and present feelings.”).
33. See Goodpaster, supra note 32, at 318.  “If counsel fails to develop and present a potentially
beneficial mitigating case when one exists, an apparently principled, but in fact disproportionate, death
sentence will survive proportionality review and will stand.”  Id. at 319.
34. ABA Guidelines, supra note 31.
35. See Goodpaster, supra note 32, at 325 (“Counsel can increase the probability that the penalty
hearing will be meaningful through voir dire and has an obligation to attempt to obtain a jury of per-
sons open to an appeal for a life sentence.”).  To obtain such a jury, counsel must try to prevent the dis-
WELCH_FMT.DOC 11/22/00  1:21 PM
184 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 63: No. 3
prepare expert witnesses on subjects ranging from mental defects to abusive
backgrounds to forensic evidence.  Appellate-level representation presents an
additional difficulty: the necessity of familiarity with post-conviction proce-
dures, ignorance of which could result in the waiver of certain issues on subse-
quent appeal.
One of the most damaging strategic errors counsel make in capital cases is
to wait until the end of the guilt phase to begin thinking about how to proceed
with the mitigation case.36  Sometimes this shortsightedness stems from a law-
yer’s mistaken belief that the jury will never make a finding that could lead to a
death sentence; other times, it is the result of an attorney focusing too much on
how to avoid a guilty verdict and failing to consider the worst-case scenario.
When this happens, the attorney has already missed key moments in the plan-
ning of the penalty phase: the shaping of relationships with the client, prosecu-
tor, court personnel, and jurors; conduct of voir dire proceedings; and the na-
ture of the defenses and affirmative mitigating case presented during the guilt
phase.37  These missed opportunities are nearly impossible to overcome once a
guilty verdict has been entered.38  If the lawyer has failed to introduce the jury
and judge to the defendant’s humanity before the sentencing phase begins, it
will be difficult to break down the wall created by the horror of the crime and
its accompanying testimony.  Worse yet, if the attorney openly concedes defeat
because “the guilt phase case is virtually indefensible,” it could so prejudice the
jury or judge that no amount of mitigating evidence would salvage the penalty
phase presentation.39
To further complicate matters, the issue of money—or lack thereof—looms
large in many capital cases.40  “Even when experienced and competent counsel
are available in capital cases, they often are unable to render adequate service
for want of essential funding to pay the costs of investigations and expert wit-
charge for cause of jurors generally opposed to the death penalty, which requires careful rehabilitation.
See id. at 326.  Such careful rehabilitation may also require an attorney’s willingness to push a judge to
probe further into a potential juror’s initial response, because “[a] potential juror in a capital case who
has expressed only general objections to the death penalty cannot be excused for cause if she might
nonetheless vote to impose it in some circumstances.”  Id. at 325-26.
36. See id. at 329 (“Since the capital case defense attorney may have to be an advocate both for ac-
quittal and for life, she should not frame a defense case for acquittal which will preclude or handicap
effective advocacy for life.”).
37. See id. at 320.
38. See id. at 324 (“It is essential that counsel try the guilt phase in a manner calculated to preserve
credibility at the penalty phase.”).
39. Id. at 329.  Goodpaster argues that it is almost always appropriate to try to put on a reasonable
doubt defense.  Even in cases where there is no question as to the defendant’s guilt, it is still beneficial
to have introduced the jury to mitigating evidence before the sentencing phase begins.  See id. at 331.
40. Compensation of court-appointed attorneys varies from state to state, but nowhere can it be
said to be generous or perhaps even adequate.  For example, Texas paid defense counsel in one capital
case $11.84 an hour.  The defendant was eventually released after nine years on death row when a jury
refused to re-indict him—after his underpaid attorney was found constitutionally ineffective.  See Ste-
phen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst
Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1838-39 (1994).  For a discussion of the compensation systems in various
states, see id. at 1853-55.
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nesses.”41  Public defender programs have not been created in many jurisdic-
tions, and in others they receive too paltry a sum to be effective.42  Moreover,
court-appointed lawyers are paid such minimal fees that they cannot afford to
set aside other work; thus, they do not give the capital case the attention it re-
quires and deserves.43  State court judges often exacerbate this problem by “in-
tentionally appointing inexperienced and incapable lawyers to defend capital
cases”44 and “denying funding for essential expert and investigative needs of the
defense.”45  “The reality is that popularly elected judges, confronted by a local
community that is outraged over the murder of a prominent citizen or angered
by the facts of a crime, have little incentive to protect the constitutional rights of
the one accused in such a killing.”46  One Alabama attorney assigned to a capital
case explained how he had to forego much of his investigation for lack of fund-
ing, even though he would not have done so in a civil case because such failure
would have constituted malpractice.47  Ultimately, defense attorneys in capital
cases end up making choices, not between useful and useless lines of investiga-
tion, but between the absolutely necessary minimum and other relevant matters
that cost too much.48
The view from each side of the criminal fence is markedly different in terms
of resources and expertise.  On the prosecution side, there are often two state-
41. ABA Guidelines, supra note 31.
42. See Bright, supra note 40, at 1844.
43. See id.
44. Bright, supra note 40, at 1844.  Some states assign lawyers at random from a list, “a scheme des-
tined to identify attorneys who lack the necessary qualifications and, worse still, regard their assign-
ments as a burden.”  Resolution of the ABA House of Delegates (Feb. 1997) (Introduction: Competent
Counsel) [hereinafter Resolution].  Other courts utilize a “contract” system that appoints indigent cases
to the lowest bidders, which often does not coincide with skill level.  See Richard Klein, The Emporer
Gideon Has No Clothes: the Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Coun-
sel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 679-81 (1986).  A third system is the employment of a group of law-
yers or an organization to handle all capital cases, a sort of private “public defender” program.  See
Bright, supra note 40, at 1850.  Judges have the power to ensure the quality of the defense through their
appointment of defense counsel, but “it is no secret that elected state court judges do not appoint the
best and brightest of the legal profession to defend capital cases.”  Bright, supra note 40, at 1855-56.
45. Bright, supra note 40, at 1844.  Courts often will not approve funding requests for investigation
and experts, or will require an extensive showing of need, which the lawyer cannot make without doing
some digging to discover what is important.  See id. at 1846.  “Many lawyers find it impossible to ma-
neuver around this ‘Catch 22,’ but even when a court recognizes the right to an expert, it often author-
izes so little money that no competent expert will get involved.”  Id. at 1847.
46. Bright, supra note 40, at 1857.  Bright notes that many state judges come from a prosecutorial
background and have gained popularity with their constituents through their dogged pursuit of crimi-
nals while serving as prosecutors.  See id.  Former North Carolina Judge Joe Freeman Britt (known as
“the nation’s deadliest prosecutor” during his time as a district attorney prior to being elected to the
court) exemplifies this career path.  See Sheryle McCarthy, Fugitive from Justice: Carolina Suspect in
NY Court, NEWSDAY (Feb. 28, 1989), available in 1989 WL 3362314; see also $1.5 Million Awarded in
Wrongful Death Suit, WILMINGTON MORNING STAR (Nov. 1, 1997), available in WL 16970284 (“Joe
Freeman Britt [has been] dubbed the deadliest district attorney in America because he had the most
death-penalty convictions.”).
47. See Bright, supra note 40, at 1848.
48. See id. (“An attorney in the defense of many capital cases in Arkansas has described how law-
yers in that state are forced to perform ‘a sort of uninformed legal triage,’ ignoring some issues, lines of
investigation, and defenses because of the lack of adequate compensation and resources.”).
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funded offices that specialize in criminal cases.49  The attorneys in these depart-
ments are well-compensated, well-educated through conferences and continu-
ing legal education programs, and are provided with generous funding, the co-
operation of police and investigative agencies, and the knowledge of experts.50
After all, the prosecutors have what is understandably perceived as the worthy
task of catching “bad guys.”  It would be nearly impossible to garner public
support for more funding to aid these same “bad guys.”  The first state office,
the District Attorney’s office in each judicial district, is staffed by lawyers who
devote their time exclusively to criminal matters.51  Most court-appointed de-
fense attorneys, on the other hand, must rely on any number of other kinds of
legal work to pay the bills while they are doing their poorly funded “duty.”  The
second state office is the Attorney General’s office, which usually staffs a spe-
cialized unit to handle criminal appeals and habeas corpus matters.52  These
same inequities are perpetuated through the appellate process, in which the
state’s resources are overwhelmingly directed at preventing the resentencing or
retrial of convicted defendants, not at enabling appellate counsel to conduct an
investigation of matters that were neglected at the trial level.
The result of underfunded defense investigations and public defender sys-
tems (where they exist), reluctant court appointees, and elected judges who are
more concerned with pleasing retribution-minded constituents than with
guarding constitutional protections for capital defendants is that capital defen-
dants receive assistance of counsel that falls woefully short of the standards ob-
served in any other area of law, regardless of how the Supreme Court defines
“ineffectiveness.”  Lawyers are appointed who do not want the cases, who can-
not afford to take the cases, who have no interest or experience in criminal law,
or who lack the necessary skills to defend a capital defendant.53  “As a result, the
poor are often represented by inexperienced lawyers who view their responsi-
bilities as unwanted burdens, have no inclination to help their clients, and have
no incentive to develop criminal trial skills.”54  Ironically, once attorneys have
learned enough from their experience as appointed counsel to become truly ef-
fective advocates, they often become too cynical, tired, or emotionally drained
to continue voluntarily to represent indigent capital defendants.  Then another
round of young, inexperienced attorneys are run through the appointment
wringer, only to escape as quickly as possible.55
49. See id. at 1844.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.  At least one such unit has been given the “affectionate” nickname of the “death
squad,” because of its role in ensuring that capital sentences are not overturned.  Interview with Joan
Erwin, Former Prosecutor, North Carolina Attorney General’s Office, at Duke University (Oct. 28,
1999).  Erwin formerly was a member of the capital prosecution team of the North Carolina Attorney
General’s Office.
53. See Bright, supra note 40, at 1849.
54. Id. at 1849-50.
55. See id. at 1851.
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As a cumulative result of these circumstances, capital defendants’ fates
hinge not so much on an individualized determination of the aggravating and
mitigating factors of their cases as on the performance of counsel.  Whereas a
civil client seeking legal assistance on a matter can rely on her attorney being
properly educated and experienced in that particular subject area, capital de-
fendants often must take what they can get.  There are legitimate and constitu-
tional reasons that some individuals receive the death penalty, while others are
given life sentences.  However, even some who work in the system acknowledge
that the facts of the cases do little to help sort out how life is meted out versus
death.56  States generally concern themselves very little with the adequacy of the
performance of defense attorneys in capital cases, focusing instead on whether
the defendant was physically accompanied by someone during the trial.57
Some efforts have been made to establish standards for counsel in capital
cases.58  They are, however, merely recommendations, and, given budgetary
constraints and the unpopularity of capital defendants as a “cause,” it is unlikely
that they will become anything more in the future.  The ABA has stated that its
“guidelines make it clear that ordinary professional qualifications are inade-
quate to measure what is needed from counsel” in death penalty litigation.59  In-
stead, they provided a list of qualifications that were viewed as imperative to
providing effective assistance.  The main requirements concern years of litiga-
tion experience, prior experience in criminal trials, participation in capital cases,
and specific training in capital defense litigation.60  The guidelines also provide
56. See id. at 1841. “A member of the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles has said that if the
files of 100 cases punished by death and 100 punished by life were shuffled, it would be impossible to
sort them out by sentence based upon information in the files about the crime and the offender.”  Id. at
1840.
57. See id. at 1852 (“The vice president of the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association once described
the simple test used in that state to determine whether a defendant receives adequate counsel as ‘the
mirror test.’  ‘You put a mirror under the court-appointed lawyer’s nose, and if the mirror clouds up,
that’s adequate counsel.’”).
58. For example, the Montana Supreme Court released a proposed set of competency standards
for counsel in capital cases, which resemble the ABA’s recommended guidelines.  See Standards Seek to
Ensure Competent Defense in Death Penalty Cases, MONTANA LAWYER, Feb. 24, 1999, at 27.  The
standards include a requirement that two counsel be appointed to represent capital defendants, and ap-
pellate counsel are required to have appellate experience, not just capital trial experience.  See id.  The
Supreme Court of Indiana has also adapted a framework for dealing with ineffectiveness claims.  See
Woods v. Indiana, 701 N.E.2d 1208 (Ind. 1998) (describing three broad categories of issues dealing with
IAC claims and whether they should have been raised earlier—those that can be evaluated on the face
of the record, those that require some development of the record in order to evaluate the claim and
those that are a mixture of both—and requiring a more stringent application of the cause and prejudice
test where the record is well developed); see also Anne M. Voigts, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle:
Procedural Default, Habeas Reform, and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1103 (1999) (arguing that federal courts, when considering procedurally defaulted IAC claims
made by state prisoners, should consider three variables in evaluating the element of cause in proce-
dural default—whether counsel would have been required to plead his or her own incompetence,
whether the petitioner could have reasonably recognized possible grounds for the claim at the time it
should have been raised, and whether the record would have been adequately developed to evaluate
such a claim at the time it should have been raised).
59. Resolution, supra note 44.
60. See ABA Guidelines, supra note 31.
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standards for plea negotiations, voir dire, and jury selection.61  The ABA has
further stated that minimum standards that have been promulgated are not suf-
ficient, and “counsel in death penalty cases should be required to perform at the
level of an attorney reasonably skilled in the specialized practice of capital rep-
resentation, zealously committed to the capital case, who has had adequate time
and resources for preparation.”62
Almost a decade after it published its guidelines for capital defense counsel,
the ABA revisited the issue, finding that “administration of the death pen-
alty . . . is instead a haphazard maze of unfair practices with no internal consis-
tency.  To a substantial extent, this situation has developed because death pen-
alty jurisdictions generally have failed to implement the types of policies called
for by existing ABA policies.”63  In 1982, the ABA, together with the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association, stated that the promise of Gideon v.
Wainwright64 remains unrealized because courts and legislatures have been un-
willing to “put our money where our mouth is.”65  Challenges have been brought
to the inadequacy of fees paid to court-appointed attorneys, and commissions
have undertaken a number of studies on the defects in representation of indi-
gent defendants.66  Despite these and other protests against the current system,
however, Congress and the Supreme Court have narrowed capital defendants’
opportunities for appeal without dealing with the problems detailed above and
below.67  Until these problems are addressed, capital defendants—individuals
who face the gravest punishment—will continue to be deemed worthy only of
the bare minimum legal representation.68
IV
THE STRICKLAND STANDARD IN REVIEW OF CAPITAL IAC CLAIMS
All of the problems detailed above have resulted in countless appeals based
on the errors and omissions of counsel.  In fact, challenges to death sentences
are frequently based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in both state
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. Resolution, supra note 44.
64. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
65. Bright, supra note 40, at 1866 (citing AMERICAN BAR ASS’N AND THE NAT’L LEGAL AID &
DEFENDER ASS’N, GIDEON UNDONE!  THE CRISIS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE FUNDING 3 (1982)).
66. See generally Bright, supra note 40, at 1866-70.
67. See discussion infra Part IV, Section C.  The discussion centers on the passage of the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and several Supreme Court decisions that elabo-
rated on or narrowed Strickland.
68. See Bright, supra note 40, at 1870:
“[W]e set our sights on the embarrassing target of mediocrity.  I guess that means about halfway.
And that raises a question.  Are we willing to put up with halfway justice?  To my way of thinking,
one-half justice must mean one-half injustice, and one-half injustice is no justice at all.”
Id. (quoting Chief Justice Harold G. Clarke, Annual State of the [Georgia] Judiciary Address, reprinted
in FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Jan. 14, 1993, at 5).
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and federal post-conviction proceedings.69  Although it has long been estab-
lished that criminal defendants have the right to assistance of counsel, it was not
until 1970 that the Supreme Court described this right as “the right to the effec-
tive assistance of counsel.”70  With the exception of one decision dealing with
the issue of counsel having a conflict of interest,71 however, the Court did not
define “effective” until it entered judgment in Strickland.72  With that decision,
the Supreme Court effectively undermined the landmark decision of Furman v.
Georgia73 and returned the imposition of death sentences to the realm of arbi-
trariness, inconsistency, and—according to its own analysis in Furman and sub-
sequent cases—unconstitutionality.74  Defendants who raise claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel are now forced to allow appellate judges to consider the
facts as they should have been presented and then to accept the judges’ deter-
mination of how a jury would have considered that information.  Strickland,
which is nothing more than a carefully reasoned capitulation to the myriad
flaws in the nation’s system of capital punishment, therefore violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, based on past Su-
preme Court jurisprudence.
A. Overview of Strickland v. Washington
The respondent in Strickland went on a crime spree in 1976 that included
“three brutal stabbing murders, torture, kidnapping, severe assaults, attempted
murders, attempted extortion, and theft.”75  He eventually confessed to all the
crimes, notwithstanding his counsel’s advice.76  The respondent once again acted
against his lawyer’s advice by waiving his right to a jury trial and pleading guilty
to all charges.77  After experiencing “a sense of hopelessness about the case,”78
counsel did only minimal preparation for the respondent’s sentencing hearing.79
He spoke with the respondent about his background and spoke on the tele-
phone with the respondent’s wife and mother; otherwise, he did not seek out
69. See Voigts, supra note 58, at 1118:
In part, the large number of petitions raising such claims derives from the fact that a complaint of
ineffective assistance is often a precondition for raising claims that the courts could not otherwise
decide either because of waiver or procedural default.  In addition, such claims show up on collat-
eral review because practical and legal obstacles bar their correction on direct appeal.
Id.  For example, it is unlikely that appellate counsel who is the same as trial counsel will assert a claim
of ineffective assistance; but, in failing to do so, the defendant may be precluded from later raising an
IAC claim in state court.
70. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
71. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
72. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
73. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
74. See id. at 239-40.
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character witnesses for the sentencing.80  The lawyer also did not conduct other
investigations typically undertaken in capital cases, including a request for a
psychiatric examination and a search for other evidence of his client’s character
and emotional state.81
In the majority opinion, Justice O’Connor attributed this lack of investiga-
tion to “trial counsel’s sense of hopelessness about overcoming the evidentiary
effect of respondent’s confessions to the gruesome crimes.”82  Her opinion puts
the cart before the horse, stating that “because the sentencing judge had stated
that the death sentence would be appropriate even if respondent had no signifi-
cant prior history, no substantial prejudice resulted from the absence at sen-
tencing of the character evidence . . . . “83  The Court therefore affirmed the trial
court’s decision that was made without the complete picture.  In effect, the
Court held that some cases have such bad facts that it does not matter what the
complete story is.  Such an assumption directly contradicts the Court’s holding
that the sentencing body is entitled to hear any mitigating evidence before
making its decision.84
The respondent claimed that the Constitution required that a conviction or
death sentence be set aside when counsel’s assistance at the trial or sentencing
was ineffective.85  By deciding the case as it did, the Court appears to apply the
Strickland rule to all criminal convictions and sentences, not just to capital
cases.  The Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis, however, only addresses the
flaws in the decision as they affect capital defendants.  The Court evaluated the
attorney’s strategic choices in the respondent’s trial, concluding that counsel’s
performance was not so inadequate as to constitute a violation of the Sixth
Amendment right to assistance of counsel.86  In so doing, the Court established a
two-part test of effectiveness.  To obtain a reversal of a conviction or a death
sentence, a convicted defendant must show that counsel’s performance was de-
ficient, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to de-
prive the defendant of a fair trial.87  A court considering an ineffective assistance
80. See id. at 673.
81. See id.
82. Id.  While Justice O’Connor appears to accept this as a valid justification, it is not.  Respon-
dent’s guilt is not the issue at the sentencing phase; it has already been established.  Rather, counsel’s
role is to show the court why, despite his guilt, the respondent was deserving of mercy.  A mentally ill
person or an individual from a horribly abusive, unstable environment may well be unquestionably
guilty, but the circumstances of his or her upbringing may convince a judge or jury that a life sentence is
appropriate.  Further, even though the respondent may have disregarded counsel’s advice, that does
not justify his attorney giving up on the mitigation case.  Frustrating as such a decision may be, it is the
client’s to make, and counsel’s job is to be a zealous advocate in whatever advocacy is needed.
83. Id. at 677.
84. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).  If the Court does indeed believe that some facts are
so bad that no untold story could make a difference, then its prohibition of mandatory death penalty
statutes in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), seems an empty principle.
85. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 671.
86. See id. at 686 (“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether coun-
sel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result.”).
87. See id. at 687.
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claim does not have to approach the inquiry in the same order or even consider
both; if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one of the components,
the court need not consider the other.88  The Court also held that a federal ha-
beas challenge based on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents a
mixed question of law and fact; therefore, a federal court is not bound by state
court findings of fact.89
The first prong of the required showing addresses the performance of coun-
sel, requiring evidence that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amend-
ment.”90  Because the standard under the Sixth Amendment has been held to be
reasonably effective assistance,91 the “defendant must show that counsel’s repre-
sentation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”92  Reasonableness
in this context is measured under prevailing professional norms and according
to the circumstances at the time of trial.  This notion of reasonableness is a slip-
pery one: “Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Associa-
tion standards and the like . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable, but
they are only guides.”93  Because no set of rules could adequately or fairly take
into account the wide range of circumstances faced by such counsel, the Court
held that judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.94
In fact, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defen-
dant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the chal-
lenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’”95
The Court left a great deal of flexibility for appellate courts to determine if
counsel’s performance—or, as is more common, lack of performance—is some-
how strategic or reasonable.96  This reflects the Court’s belief that any higher
standard would “encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges.”97
Apparently, the Court decided that controlling the deluge of appeals by con-
victed defendants was preferable to holding attorneys accountable for anything
but the most blatant sort of negligent practice.  Granted, it was facing not only
the issue of appeals for individuals on death row, but rather for any convicted
criminal.  Nonetheless, the Court had the power to apply a “death-is-different”
standard in capital cases, if it so desired.
88. See id. at 697 (“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of suf-
ficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.”).
89. See id. at 698.  State court findings of fact, however, are subject to the deference requirement of
28 U.S.C. §2254(d) (1994), and district court findings are reversible only if found to be clearly errone-
ous under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).  See id.
90. Id. at 687.
91. See id. at 687 (citing Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 151-52 (2d Cir. 1983)).
92. Id. at 687-88.
93. Id. at 688.
94. See id. at 688-89.
95. Id. (citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1995)).
96. See id. at 688-89.
97. Id. at 690.
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Instead, all that is imposed on counsel in capital cases is “a duty to make
reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particu-
lar investigations unnecessary.”98  One big qualification further muddies any
semblance of a standard provided by the first prong:  “The reasonableness of
counsel’s actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defen-
dant’s own statements or actions.”99  But this qualification, which states that
counsel’s decisions are properly based on information supplied by the defen-
dant,100 presupposes a defendant who understands what kind of mitigating evi-
dence could save his life, who is mentally stable enough to be cooperative and
to trust an attorney, and who comprehends what sorts of harmful experiences in
the past might have bearing on a capital sentence.101
The second prong of the Strickland inquiry also eludes any true comprehen-
sion or predictability.  The Court had previously held that “an error by counsel,
even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judg-
ment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.”102  In
other words, the defendant must be prejudiced by the ineffective assistance in
order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment.103  Very few actions war-
rant a presumption of prejudice—namely, some types of state interference with
counsel’s performance and an actual conflict of interest for the attorney.104  Fur-
ther, the defendant must show more than “some conceivable effect.”105  Rather,
he must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s un-
professional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”106
The Court rejected an even more stringent requirement that the defendant
show that counsel’s poor performance more likely than not altered the outcome
of the case.107  Nonetheless, the standard has proven to be a very difficult hurdle
to clear in many jurisdictions.108  This variation between jurisdictions in how
much prejudice is enough makes an unclear test even more inconsistent in ap-
plication.109
98. Id. at 691.
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. In addition, it presupposes a defendant who is interested in saving his own life, which is often
not the case.  Some might argue that there is no problem in proceeding with an execution, since even
the defendant himself does not object.  However, given that many individuals on death row are men-
tally ill, suicidal, or severely depressed, this argument does not provide much consolation to prisoners’
advocates.
102. Id. (citing analogous statement in United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364-65 (1981)).
103. See id. at 692.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 693.
106. Id. at 694.  This test finds its roots in the test for materiality of exculpatory information not dis-
closed to the defense by the prosecution and the test for materiality of testimony made unavailable to
the defense by the government in deportation cases.  See id.
107. See id. at 693 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108. For example, the Fourth Circuit has yet to find that counsel was ineffective in a capital case.
109. See id. at 708 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Justice Marshall in his dissent voiced the concern that
the majority’s decision will increase inconsistency and inject more arbitrariness into death penalty deci-
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When considering whether there is a reasonable probability that counsel’s
deficient conduct altered the result (not merely the presentation) of the case,
the appellate court is to presume that the decisionmaker was “reasonably, con-
scientiously, and impartially applying the standards that govern the decision.”110
In a challenge to a death sentence, the defendant must show that there is a rea-
sonable probability that the sentencer would have voted for a life sentence if
counsel had provided effective assistance.111  This requires consideration of all of
the evidence before the judge or jury.112  Because only some of the factual find-
ings will be affected by counsel’s errors, it is important to look at the totality of
the circumstances when determining whether the errors were constitutional
violations.  For example, failure to put on a case in the mitigation phase of trial
does not necessarily have any bearing on the conviction, whereas it may have
had a prejudicial effect on the sentence.  Ultimately, the appellate court must
decide whether “the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of
a breakdown in the adversarial process.”113
B. The Constitutional Failings of Strickland
While the majority was apparently satisfied that its decision cleared up ques-
tions about what the Sixth Amendment right to counsel meant in terms of
challenges to convictions and sentences, Strickland only served to perpetuate
the arbitrariness supposedly prohibited by Furman and to leave courts wide lati-
tude to ignore the low standard of performance expected of counsel appointed
to represent individuals on trial for their lives.  As Justice Marshall stated, the
standard adopted in Strickland “is so malleable that, in practice, it will either
have no grip at all or will yield excessive variation in the manner in which the
Sixth Amendment is interpreted and applied by different courts.”114  Appellate
courts are left to discern what a reasonable attorney would have done in repre-
senting a client, based on counsel’s explanations of “strategy” and on the ac-
tions of and information provided by a convicted murderer.  And, given count-
less problems in the current defense system for indigents, Justice Marshall
asked a crucial question: “Is a ‘reasonably competent attorney’ a reasonably
competent adequately paid retained lawyer or a reasonably competent ap-
pointed attorney?”115  Another question that the Court did not answer is
whether appellate courts should be troubled by the fact that “a manifestly guilty
defendant is convicted after a trial in which he was represented by a manifestly
ineffective attorney.”116  The answer requires an analysis of the Sixth Amend-
sions.  See id. (“Should the standard of performance mandated by the Sixth Amendment vary by lo-
cale?”).
110. Id. at 695.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 696.
114. Id. at 707 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 708 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 711 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
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ment right to assistance of counsel that has not been undertaken.  If the right to
effective counsel is the fundamental right the Court has declared it to be, then it
would seem that even the guilty are entitled to receive it, because the Constitu-
tion does not sanction the violation of the guilty’s constitutional rights.
The “malleability” of the Strickland standard is contrary to the Court’s deci-
sion in Furman regarding the constitutionality of the death penalty.117  The
Eighth Amendment states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”118  The Due
Process Clause makes this prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
applicable to state proceedings as well.119  The five justices who wrote the sepa-
rate, concurring opinions that held unconstitutional a death penalty statute
whose imposition was left up to the discretion of the judge or jury repeatedly
emphasized that death is different.120  Justice Stewart expressed the opinion that:
[T]he penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in de-
gree but in kind.  It is unique in its total irrevocability.  It is unique in its rejection of
rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice.  And it is unique, fi-
nally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity.121
Because the courts are dealing with the life of a human being, any discretion
given to the sentencing or appellate body should be guided and limited to
minimize arbitrariness.122
After Furman, the Supreme Court rejected mandatory death penalty stat-
utes because of their “failure to allow the particularized consideration of rele-
vant aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant before the
imposition upon him of a sentence of death.”123  Without such individualized tri-
als and sentencing, capital defendants were being treated just as arbitrarily as
they were when their lives were in the hands of an unguided judge or jury.  Ei-
ther way, the facts and circumstances of the individual defendant’s life were not
taken into account.  Justice Douglas wrote in Furman that permitting unbridled
discretion was part of:
a system of law and of justice that leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or ju-
ries the determination of whether defendants committing these crimes should die or
be imprisoned.  Under these laws no standards govern the selection of the penalty.
People live or die, depending on the whim of one man or of twelve.124
But after Strickland, capital defendants who raise IAC claims live or die on the
unguided determination of an appellate court that was never intended to be the
117. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
118. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
119. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 n.1.
120. See id. at 305.
121. Id.
122. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (“[W]here discretion is afforded a sentencing
body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that
discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capri-
cious action.”).
123. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976).
124. Strickland, 408 U.S. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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only hearer of the evidence ineffective counsel failed to present.  All Strickland
did was shift the unguided discretion up a level.  The majority stated that it was
providing a standard by which to judge the effectiveness of counsel.125  But the
questions it leaves up to the individual appellate court are too big to provide the
controls required by the Eighth Amendment.
By allowing judges to determine whether a lawyer’s performance in a capital
trial meets a reasonable standard, and whether a deficient performance led the
decisionmaker to impose death where it otherwise would have imposed a life
sentence—an inquiry that eludes standardization—Strickland has resurrected
some of the same fears that were supposedly put to rest after Furman.  In dis-
cussing the history of the Eighth Amendment and the Founders’ desire for
equality in the law, Justice Douglas acknowledged that:
the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to
be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and de-
spised, and lacking political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular mi-
nority, and saving those who by social position may be in a more protected position.126
As the cases raising IAC claims discussed below demonstrate, defendants on
death row who have received subpar legal counsel face appellate decisions that
are as predictable as a lightning strike.127  As Justice Brennan stated in Furman:
[w]hen a country of over 200 million people inflicts an unusually severe punishment no
more than 50 times a year, the inference is strong that the punishment is not being
regularly and fairly applied . . . . When the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial
number of the cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is virtually inescap-
able that it is being inflicted arbitrarily.  Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lottery
system.128
Though the numbers may have changed somewhat, especially given recent ef-
forts to shorten the chain of available appeals, the death penalty is still imposed
in a small percentage of cases.  And for those who are unfortunate enough to
receive barely passable counsel, their only protection from further arbitrariness
is a standard that does little more than state what effective counsel should be,
while leaving it up to appellate courts to determine what in fact it was in a par-
ticular case.  Meanwhile, the judges and juries who made their decision based
on an incomplete story are foreclosed from expressing the opinion that the
whole story would have meant everything, especially to the defendant.
125. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686:
In giving meaning to the requirement, however, we must take its purpose—to ensure a fair trial—as
the guide. The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s con-
duct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied
on as having produced a just result.
Id.
126. Furman, 408 U.S. at 255.
127. See id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the
same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.”).
128. Id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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C. Other Failings of Strickland: Caving to Pressures Outside of Constitutional
Law
The problems with the system of court appointments and poorly funded
public defenders offices, as well as problems inherent in the court system in
general, likely contributed to the constitutional backpedaling evident in Strick-
land and to more recent efforts to further limit appeals by capital defendants.
Time constraints are one example of outside pressure that has affected courts’
willingness to be fierce guardians of inmates’ constitutional rights.  The courts
are so backlogged and overburdened that judges are eager to support any leg-
islation that will curtail additional burdens.  As Justice O’Connor noted in
Strickland, the availability of “intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney per-
formance or of detailed guidelines for its evaluation” would invite a flood of
IAC claims.129  Lest that happen, judges were left with wide discretion to evalu-
ate such claims.
Further to limit “frivolous” appeals (and, unfortunately, many meritorious
ones), Congress in 1996 enacted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act (“AEDPA”)130, which limits appeals for individuals on death row in a
number of ways.131  A key provision of the AEDPA is § 2254(d)(1), which now
states that:
federal courts may not grant an application for habeas corpus with respect to any
claims that were adjudicated on the merits in the state court proceedings, unless that
adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States” . . . or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court pro-
ceeding.132
In 1999, the Supreme Court granted certiorari133 on the question of the stan-
dard to be applied by federal courts in granting a habeas petition following the
passage of the AEDPA, and on the Fourth Circuit’s application of the Strick-
land standard in a capital case.134  The Court granted certiorari to decide the
following three questions: (1) whether a court properly should require that a de-
fendant show that, absent the trial counsel’s deficient performance, all twelve
jurors would have voted for life imprisonment instead of imposing the death
129. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; see also supra text accompanying note 97.
130. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1218, 1219 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1)-(2)).
131. See Resolution, supra note 44:
[The Act] establishes deadlines for filing federal habeas petitions, places limits on federal evidentiary
hearings into the facts underlying federal constitutional claims, sets timetables for federal court action,
limits the availability of appellate review, establishes even more demanding restrictions on second or
successive applications for federal relief, and, in some instances, apparently bars the federal courts
from awarding relief on the basis of federal constitutional violations where state courts have erred in
concluding that no such violation occurred.
Id.
132. Voigts, supra note 58, at 1112 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 254 (d) (West Supp. 1998)).
133. See Williams v. Taylor, 526 U.S. 1050 (1999).
134. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000).
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penalty, even where state law would have mandated a life sentence if only one
juror had voted for life imprisonment; (2) whether a state court’s decision to
deny a federal constitutional claim is contrary to “clearly established federal law
only if it is in square conflict” with a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court; and
(3) whether the appellate court erred by improperly limiting the responsibility
of federal courts to decide questions of federal constitutional law.135
In the underlying case, the Virginia Supreme Court had held that Lockhart
v. Fretwell,136 modified the Strickland standard for determining prejudice by re-
quiring a separate inquiry into fundamental fairness, “even when [the defen-
dant] is able to show that his lawyer was ineffective and that his ineffectiveness
probably affected the outcome of the proceeding.”137  The Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the two-pronged Strickland test, holding that the Virginia Supreme
Court’s “decision turned on its erroneous view that a’mere’ difference in out-
come is not sufficient to establish constitutionally ineffective assistance of coun-
sel.”138
The second part of the Court’s analysis concerned the standard federal
courts should apply under the AEDPA.  The Court reversed the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s interpretation of an “unreasonable application” of law under §
2254(d)(1), which was that “a state-court decision involves an ‘unreasonable
application of . . . clearly established Federal law’ only if the state court has ap-
plied federal law ‘in a manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is unrea-
sonable.’”139.  The Court noted that “Congress viewed § 2254(d)(1) as an impor-
tant means by which its goals for habeas reform would be achieved,”140 but it did
not “mislead federal habeas courts by focusing their attention on a subjective
inquiry rather than on an objective one.”.141  Rather, the Court held that, under
the “unreasonable application” clause, “a federal habeas court may grant the
writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this
Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the
prisoner’s case.”142  While the Court’s decision did leave federal courts some dis-
cretion in granting habeas petitions, it nonetheless left Strickland as ambiguous
as before and reinforced the goal of the AEDPA that federal courts use the
“utmost care” by “carefully weighing” a state court’s reasons for denying an
IAC claim.143
In addition to the problems created for defense programs, budget problems
no doubt played a role in the Supreme Court’s decision that the Constitution
does not require states to provide counsel in capital post-conviction proceed-
135. See Williams, 526 U.S. at 1050.
136. 506 U.S. 364 (1993)
137. Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1513.
138. Id. at 1515
139. Id. at 1521 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 143 F.3d 860, 870 (4th Cir. 1998)) (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 1518.
141. Id. at 1522.
142. Id. at 1523.
143. Id. at 1518.
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ings.144  Similarly, Congress ended funding for post-conviction defender organi-
zations, which handled many post-conviction cases and assisted lawyers working
on such cases.145  These two changes have contributed greatly to the problem of
ineffective assistance of counsel being provided to capital defendants.
Federalism has also been an underlying theme in some of the recent deci-
sions and legislation limiting habeas petitions.146  Congress and the Supreme
Court have been increasingly reluctant to give federal courts much power to
second-guess the decisions of state courts regarding appeals from capital sen-
tences.147  Another factor in this reluctance may be the public’s negative percep-
tion of the appellate process and the view that inmates on death row use the
courts to delay their executions with frivolous claims.  The public does not want
to see any more money “wasted” on capital appeals, a powerful force in con-
vincing elected state judges to push for less interference from federal courts.
The nature of the current system of court appointments also may have con-
tributed to increasing limitations placed on IAC claims, beginning with Strick-
land.  There is an obvious conflict between the practice of appointing counsel
and the lawyer’s ethical obligation to be a zealous advocate for the client.148
When lawyers are forced into complex, emotionally draining service and then
compensated with minimal pay, they are unlikely to embrace their role with the
zeal envisioned by the ABA.  However, the use of full-time death penalty litiga-
tion centers also has its disadvantages, namely quick burnout, few resources,
case overloads, and an increasing cynicism that interferes with counsel’s ability
to be an effective advocate.  If courts acknowledge these systemic failings, more
standards will be implemented that make the death penalty increasingly rare.
But if this were to happen, it would become increasingly difficult for the Su-
preme Court to justify the constitutionality of the death penalty, given its past
jurisprudence.  Moreover, courts would face the unpopular task of thwarting
the will of the majority, albeit a slender one, by abolishing the death penalty.
There is also a long history of conflict between the public’s understanding of the
death penalty as an appropriate punishment for any guilty murderer and the
principles of Furman, which makes it impossible for judges to uphold the will of
the people and the Constitution, at least in the realm of capital punishment.
The Court was unwilling to address these factors in its analysis in Strickland,
because recognition of the broken system would require a Furman-type deci-
144. See Murray v. Giarrantano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
145. See Resolution, supra note 44.
146. See, e.g., Williams, 163 F.3d at 860; Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993) (holding that the
court making a prejudice determination under Strickland may not consider the effect of an objection it
knows to be meritless under current governing state or federal law, even if the objection might have
been meritorious at the time counsel failed to raise it).  Both of these cases are based on challenges to
the state supreme court’s denial of habeas petitions, despite subsequent reversals by federal courts.
Federal courts will be limited beyond the AEDPA in the future if the Supreme Court finds for the state
in Williams, because it would allow state courts even greater latitude in determining how Strickland
should be applied.
147. See Resolution, supra note 44.
148. See ABA Guidelines, supra note 31.
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sion.  Instead, the Court avoided the issue by letting appellate courts sort out
the mess left by these conflicts and problems.
D. Strickland as Applied in IAC Claims: Inconsistency Stems from an
Ambiguous Standard
There are numerous examples of cases that failed the Strickland test, as well
as examples of cases that survived it.  What is most striking in examining these
cases, however, is the factual similarity between the winners and losers.  Al-
though the Supreme Court seemed to believe that its test would ensure consis-
tency in appellate decisions on IAC claims, instead it has added another layer of
arbitrariness that was found unconstitutional in Furman.  In the discussion of
the several cases that follow, it becomes disturbingly clear that Strickland did
little more than assent to the practice of appellate judges disposing of IAC
claims based on their personal view of the mitigating evidence the decisionmak-
ers never heard or saw, because there does not seem to be any pattern to what
type of information will pass muster and what will not.  While Strickland implies
that these contradictions are permissible when the sentencing body has been
given some guidance in making its decisions,149 because of this nation’s long tra-
dition of trusting juries to sort out the distinctions between seemingly similar
facts, nothing in the Court’s pre-Strickland jurisprudence would indicate that it
is permissible for appellate courts to decide whether a defendant lives or dies
based on their weighing of facts that were never heard by the constitutionally-
sanctioned decisionmaker.
Many of the cases that have passed the Strickland test involve counsel’s fail-
ure to investigate and present mitigation evidence at the sentencing phase.150
While the mitigation evidence later investigated by appellate counsel varied
from case to case, most courts seem to find that an absolute lack of a case in
mitigation does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.  This is not
surprising, because it is more or less the “mirror test”151 that requires at least
some participation by counsel.  Because the cases discussed below provide suf-
ficient examples of the kinds of information ineffective counsel can fail to dis-
cover, it is unnecessary to provide details from the above-mentioned cases.
(Unfortunately, the number of ways in which lawyers can be ineffective is
probably as great as the number of ways individuals can end up on death row.)
Very few cases successfully raise IAC claims at the guilt level, typically because
there is plenty of independent evidence of guilt; thus, any stumbling by counsel
does not cast doubt on the reliability of the decision.  Therefore, this section
will focus on errors at the sentencing phase.
149. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.
150. See, e.g., Dobbs v. Turpin, 142 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 1998); Middleton v. Dugger, 849 F.2d 491
(11th Cir. 1988); Thomas v. Kemp, 796 F.2d 1322 (11th Cir. 1986); Tyler v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741 (11th
Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds, Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479 (11th Cir. 1986); Rondon v. Indi-
ana, 711 N.E.2d 506 (Ind. 1999); Busby v. Butler, 538 So. 2d 164 (La. 1988).
151. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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In three recent cases, counsel performed so poorly that the defendant’s IAC
claim managed to scale the high barrier created by Strickland.  In the first, the
federal district court for the western district of Pennsylvania granted habeas re-
lief to the petitioner, Lawrence Duane Christy, after a veritable fiasco of a
trial.152  Christy had been involuntarily committed to various mental health insti-
tutions over a number of years.153  During that time, Dennis McGlynn had pre-
sided over his commitment proceedings.154  McGlynn was also one of the prose-
cutors at Christy’s capital trial, in which the prosecution dismissed Christy’s
claims of mental illness and labeled him “manipulative.”155  The trial judge, who
refused to appoint a defense psychiatrist, had also presided at several of
Christy’s commitment proceedings.156  Defense counsel failed to conduct a psy-
chiatric evaluation and never investigated Christy’s records; if he had, he would
have discovered that McGlynn had already compiled records identifying
Christy’s mental illnesses as “active psychosis,” “schizophrenia,” and “organic
brain syndrome.”157  During the sentencing phase, defense counsel only called
Christy’s mother and a witness who hurt the defense.158  He also failed to object
to any of the prosecution’s arguments about the state of Christy’s mental
health.159  Worse yet, counsel failed to object to the prosecution’s request that
the defendant crawl on the floor to act out the victim’s death.160  There were
several other glaring errors made by the defense, but the failure to present evi-
dence on Christy’s mental illness was the most damaging.  As a result, his peti-
tion for habeas corpus was granted.161
In another case, Collier v. Turpin, the sentencing phase began—without
counsel’s objection—at 8:00 p.m., shortly after the jury returned with a guilty
verdict.162  The jury retired to deliberate at 9:28 p.m., returning its sentencing
verdict just after midnight.163  For reasons that the circuit court found improb-
able, defense counsel believed that the judge had limited mitigating evidence to
the defendant’s reputation for truth and veracity.164  As a result, he failed to in-
troduce evidence about the defendant’s character and uncontrolled diabetes,
which a doctor later testified could have contributed to his irrational behavior
the day of the murder.165  According to the appellate petition, such evidence
would have demonstrated that the defendant was a good family man, an up-
152. See Christy v. Horn, 28 F. Supp. 2d 307 (W.D. Pa. 1998).
153. See id. at 311.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 315.
156. See id. at 311.
157. Id. at 314.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 323.
161. See id. at 327.
162. See Collier v. Turpin, 177 F.3d 1184, 1188 (11th Cir. 1999).
163. See id.
164. See id. at 1194.
165. See id. at 1198.
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standing public citizen who had once risked his life to save another, and a dia-
betic who had trouble controlling his behavior when not properly medicated.166
Because counsel “presented almost none of the readily available evidence of
Collier’s background and character that would have led the jury to eschew the
death penalty,” the Eleventh Circuit granted the defendant’s habeas petition
with respect to his death sentence. 167
As a final example of assistance found to satisfy the Strickland standard, a
defendant in Louisiana was granted an evidentiary hearing on the issue of inef-
fectiveness of counsel at the sentencing phase.168  Wilson, the defendant, con-
tended that his attorney did not adequately investigate his background and
formulate a defense based on mental incapacity.169  The mitigation evidence
provided on appeal showed that Wilson had a poverty-stricken childhood, had
suffered a series of convulsions, possibly causing organic brain damage, had an
I.Q. of sixty-six, often went without medical treatment, and had little educa-
tion.170  Further, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia at the age of seventeen,
and had been in and out of foster homes and then jail.171  Wilson’s lawyer never
investigated his mental problems, sought medical records, or had Wilson ex-
amined by a psychiatrist.172  Because his lawyer failed to conduct a reasonable
investigation, and the facts ignored may have provided a statutory mitigating
circumstance, the court ordered a hearing on this issue.173  Had the court failed
to do so, Wilson would have been convicted by a jury who had only heard about
his violent crime, but were completely unaware that the man they had sen-
tenced was mentally ill.
There are, unfortunately, any number of cases that demonstrate similar
facts, but are found not to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland.  Several
such cases are chronicled in a law review article that criticizes the way defense is
provided in capital cases.174  In one, a Texas defense lawyer failed to introduce
any evidence about the client at the penalty phase.175  His closing argument re-
garding sentencing was:  “You are an extremely intelligent jury.  You’ve got
that man’s life in your hands.  You can take it or not.  That’s all I have to say.”176
The Fifth Circuit held that counsel’s performance was reasonable as a “dra-
166. See id. at 1197.  For a detailed explanation of the mitigating evidence that was not presented,
see Collier, 177 F.3d at 1200 n.20.  Incidentally, the lawyer found constitutionally ineffective in this case
was also the attorney in Dobbs v. Turpin, 142 F.3d 1383 (1998).
167. Id. at 1202.
168. See Wilson v. Butler, 813 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1987).
169. See id. at 668.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 669.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 673.
174. See Bright, supra note 40.
175. See Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1989).
176. Id. at 875.
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matic ploy,” thereby denying relief.177  As a result, the defendant was executed
while the lawyer later was suspended for an unrelated reason.178
In a Georgia case, the defendant, John Young, was represented by a lawyer
who was dependent on amphetamines and other drugs during trial.179  His attor-
ney was also “physically exhausted, suffering severe emotional strain, and dis-
tracted from his law practice because of marital problems, child custody ar-
rangements, difficulties in a relationship with a lover, and the pressures of a
family business.”180  He prepared little for trial and performed ineptly.181  A few
weeks after Young was sentenced to death, he encountered his lawyer in prison,
where he had been sent after pleading guilty to federal and state drug charges.182
Young was executed on March 20, 1985.183
In a case very similar in facts to Collier v. Turpin,184 a trial attorney failed to
present any evidence of defendant James Messer’s severe mental impairment,
his steady employment record, military record, church attendance, and coopera-
tion with the police.185  To make matters worse, counsel “repeatedly hinted [in
his closing argument] that death was the most appropriate punishment for his
own client.”186  Despite these omissions and errors, Messer was executed in 1988.
In another Eleventh Circuit case, the court denied defendant’s habeas petition
where his attorney failed to investigate his background in any way or to have a
psychiatric evaluation conducted, stating that “nothing Solomon [counsel] could
have presented would have rebutted the testimony concerning Thompson’s par-
ticipation in the brutal torture murder.”187  While the facts of the murder were
extremely gruesome and disturbing, it is likewise disturbing to read a court ex-
pressing the view that it had decided on death, regardless of the mitigating case.
When an appellate court has that sort of reaction to the facts, is there any way it
can fairly apply the Strickland test?
Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit tells a tale of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel and judicial procedure gone awry that should make even pro-
ponents of Strickland reconsider whether it has changed anything.188  Thomas
Thompson was executed in 1998 for the rape and murder of Ginger Fleischli.
He maintained that he was innocent of the crime until his death.189  Both
177. See id. at 877.
178. See Bright, supra note 40, at 1859.
179. See id. (citing Affidavit of Charles Marchman, Jr. at 1-5, Young v. Kemp, No. 85-98-2MAC
(M.D. Ga. 1985)).




184. 177 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 1999); see supra text accompanying note 162.
185. See Messer v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080, 1088 (11th Cir. 1985).
186. Bright, supra note 40, at 1860.
187. Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986).
188. See Stephen Reinhardt, The Anatomy of an Execution: Fairness vs. “Process,” 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 313 (1999).
189. See Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), rev’d and remanded, 118 S.
Ct. 1489 (1998), decided on remand, 151 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 1998).
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Thompson and his roommate, David Leitch, were charged with first-degree
murder.190  Initially, Leitch was the state’s primary suspect, because he had pre-
viously dated the victim, had a record of violent behavior, and had threatened
the victim in the past.191  The prosecution believed that Leitch had a motive, be-
cause Fleischli (his ex-girlfriend) had been interfering with his attempts to rec-
oncile with his ex-wife.192  At the joint preliminary hearing, the prosecution pre-
sented the testimony of four jailhouse informants who stated that Thompson
confessed that Leitch recruited him to help kill the victim, and that Thompson
said he had engaged in consensual sex with the victim earlier that night.193
The facts of the case are quite detailed, involving questionable conduct by
the prosecution, little assistance from trial counsel, and a series of miscommuni-
cations amongst members of the Ninth Circuit that resulted in Thompson’s
death.  The most salient points are that the prosecution used two blatantly con-
tradictory theories of the case to convict both Thompson and Leitch.  At
Thompson’s trial, the prosecution contended that he had raped the victim and
then killed her to keep her from talking.194  The prosecution used the testimony
of two notoriously untrustworthy jailhouse informants (different from the ones
used in the preliminary hearing), who received better parole arrangements as a
result.195  Once Thompson was prosecuted, the state subpoenaed the informants
used by the defense in his trial to testify for the prosecution at Leitch’s trial, af-
ter having just attacked their credibility.196  Leitch received a fairly light sen-
tence, unlike Thompson.197  The ineffective assistance claim was based on
Thompson’s counsel’s failure to contest the assertion that the victim had been
raped.198  Not only was this the aggravating factor that made Thompson, who
had no prior criminal record, death-eligible, but there was very little evidence of
rape, and Thompson maintained that they had consensual sex, which was cor-
roborated by the testimony of the original informants.199
The details of the murder and the prosecution are enough to fill an entire
law review article, but for purposes of this discussion, trial counsel’s perform-
ance is the main issue.  With regard to the rape charge and his failure to present
rebuttal evidence, Thompson’s attorney later testified that “he planned to argue
that David Leitch, not Thompson, inflicted those bruises . . . . [He] somehow
190. See id. at 1055.
191. See Calderon, 118 S. Ct. at 1494-95.
192. See Calderon, 120 F.3d at 1056.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See Calderon, 118 S. Ct. at 1503.
196. See id.
197. See id. at 1495.
198. See id. at 1496.
199. An autopsy of Fleischli showed no vaginal tearing or bruising, and the semen sample that was
taken indicated that the victim had showered (the semen matched the blood type of both defendants).
See id. at 1505.  While the victim had bruises on her wrists, palms, ankles, and other places, one expert
stated that the bruises were several weeks old, while another theorized that they could have been
caused by the removal of the body after death.  See Calderon, 120 F.3d at 1052.
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found it unnecessary to pursue readily available evidence that would have un-
dermined the State’s rape case because his theory was that Leitch raped Flei-
schli, not that no rape occurred.”200  In addition, counsel advanced a theory of
the case that contradicted the coroner’s statement that there was “no anatomi-
cal evidence of rape.”201  In so doing, he allowed the jurors to believe that a rape
had occurred and that perhaps Thompson was lying.  The district court found
this error to be both constitutionally deficient and prejudicial.202  A panel of the
Ninth Circuit reversed, however, finding that the state presented strong evi-
dence of rape and that, even if counsel’s performance was constitutionally defi-
cient, Thompson could not demonstrate prejudice.203
It was at this point that procedural mishaps brought about an ugly division
within the Ninth Circuit.  Following the Ninth Circuit’s reversal of the district
court, Thompson filed a petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en
banc, which was sent to each active judge.204  The panel denied his petitions, so
he filed with the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari.205  The Ninth Circuit
then issued its mandate denying all habeas relief.206  Thompson then tried to pe-
tition for habeas based on new evidence, which was really more of the same tes-
timony regarding consensual sex;207 he also filed with the Ninth Circuit to recall
its mandate, which it refused to do.  Two days before his set execution date, a
divided en banc panel recalled the court’s mandate—long past the deadline es-
tablished in court procedures, due to a clerical error.208  The en banc panel based
its recall decision on the fact that, absent certain “procedural misunderstandings
within [the]court,” it would have called for en banc review of the underlying de-
cision before issuing the mandate denying relief.209  Second—and more impor-
tant—it stated that the original panel’s reversal of Thomspon’s Strickland claim
would result in a “miscarriage of justice.”210
Sadly, no amount of doubt about the facts, the prosecutorial misconduct, or
the guilt of Thompson mattered.  The Supreme Court held the general rule to
be that, where a federal court of appeals recalls its mandate sua sponte in order
to revisit the merits of an earlier decision denying habeas corpus relief to a state
prisoner, the court abuses its discretion unless it acts to avoid a miscarriage of
justice as defined by habeas corpus jurisprudence and the AEDPA.211  Because
the Court held that Thompson failed to show a miscarriage of justice in this
case, it found that the en banc panel had abused its discretion by violating its
200. Id. at 1052-53.
201. Id. at 1053.
202. See id. at 1496.
203. See Thompson v. Calderon, 109 F.3d 1358, 1365 (en banc).
204. See Calderon v. Thompson, 118 S. Ct. 1489, 1496 (1998).
205. See Thompson v. Calderon, 117 S. Ct. 2426 (1997).
206. See Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1998).
207. See id.
208. See Calderon, 118 S. Ct. at 1497.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 1502.
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procedural rules, and it remanded the subsequent petition for habeas relief
back to the Ninth Circuit, instructing it to determine whether Thompson had in-
troduced any new evidence as provided for under the AEDPA.212  Because the
Ninth Circuit found that he had only reintroduced the same testimony about his
having engaged in consensual sex, the court denied this habeas petition.213  In
the end, despite a majority of the en banc panel deciding that Thompson’s exe-
cution would be a “miscarriage of justice,” he was killed.  Once again, the Su-
preme Court was able to avoid consideration of guilt and innocence by focusing
on the process of the decision.  The issue would never have gotten to this stage
in the first place, had the Ninth Circuit not been able to use Strickland to justify
its reversal of the district court’s carefully reasoned opinion.214
V
CONCLUSION
A comparison of the cases that cleared the Strickland hurdle and those that
did not suggests that all that really matters in IAC claims is the appellate court’s
view of the case.  Despite familiarity with other cases and other juries in which
evidence about mental health, family relationships, and abusive backgrounds
have made a difference, appellate courts are still able to find that such evidence
just would not have mattered in a particular case.  The Supreme Court in
Strickland fostered this kind of post-trial, ad hoc interpretation.  All that guides
the courts is a vague notion of professional norms, which are based on the
knowledge that the practice of law runs the entire spectrum from grossly negli-
gent to excellent, coupled with a prejudicial effect prong that allows judges to
determine the importance of new information to the triers of fact.  The result is
unpredictable, arbitrary rulings on IAC claims brought post-conviction.  Judge
Reinhardt convincingly sums up the dismal state of affairs for capital defen-
dants after Strickland in his tale of the Ninth Circuit’s execution of Thomas
Thompson:
When the state is out to execute the accused at all costs, and the nation’s highest
court’s primary interest is in establishing procedural rules that preclude federal courts
from considering even the most egregious violations of a defendant’s constitutional
rights, it is time to step back and look at what we are doing to ourselves and our sys-
tem of justice215
It is certainly time to reexamine a standard that eludes consistent applica-
tion and that defeats the purpose of requiring effective assistance of counsel at
the trial level.  The Supreme Court should reconsider the constitutionality of
adding yet another layer of confusion to death penalty jurisprudence.
212. See id. at 1506.
213. See Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 1998).
214. The district court judge who reviewed Thompson’s petition wrote a 101-page opinion, after
spending five years reading thousands of pages of trial transcripts and holding an evidentiary hearing at
which he heard additional testimony.  See Bright, supra note 40, at 327.
215. Reinhardt, supra note 188, at 352.
